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Abstract. The stable roommates problem with payments has as input
a graph G = (V,E) with an edge weighting w : E → R+ and the problem
is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector
p ∈ RV+ that satisfies pu + pv = w(uv) for all uv ∈M and pu = 0 for all
u unmatched in M . A solution is stable if it prevents blocking pairs, i.e.,
pairs of adjacent vertices u and v with pu+pv < w(uv). By pinpointing a
relationship to the accessibility of the coalition structure core of matching
games, we give a simple constructive proof for showing that every yes-
instance of the stable roommates problem with payments allows a path of
linear length that starts in an arbitrary unstable solution and that ends
in a stable solution. This result generalizes a result of Chen, Fujishige
and Yang [2011] for bipartite instances to general instances. We also show
that the problems Blocking Pairs and Blocking Value, which are to
find a solution with a minimum number of blocking pairs or a minimum
total blocking value, respectively, are NP-hard. Finally, we prove that the
variant of the first problem, in which the number of blocking pairs must
be minimized with respect to some fixed matching, is NP-hard, whereas
this variant of the second problem is polynomial-time solvable.
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1 Introduction
Consider a group of tennis players participating in a doubles tennis tournament.
Each two players estimate the expected prize money they could win together by
forming a pair in the tournament. Moreover, each player can negotiate his share
of the prize money with his chosen partner in order to maximize his own prize
money. Can the players be matched together such that no two players have an
incentive to leave the matching in order to form a pair together? This example
has been given by Eriksson and Karlander [6] to introduce the stable roommates
problem with payments. This problem generalizes the stable marriage problem
with payments [14] and can be modeled by a weighted graph G = (V,E), i.e.,
that has an edge weighting w : E → R+. A vector p ∈ RV with pu ≥ 0 for all
u ∈ V is said to be a matching payoff if there exists a matching M in G, such
that pu + pv = w(uv) for all uv ∈M , and pu = 0 for each u that is not incident
to an edge in M . We then say that p is a payoff with respect to M , and we call
the pair (M,p) a matching with payoffs. A pair of adjacent vertices {u, v} is a
blocking pair of p ∈ RV if pu + pv < w(uv), and their blocking value with respect
to p is ep(u, v)
+ = max{0, w(uv)− (pu + pv)}, which expresses to which extent
{u, v} is a blocking pair. We define the set of blocking pairs of a vector p ∈ RV as
B(p) = {{u, v} | pu + pv < w(uv)}, and we define the total blocking value of p as
b(p) =
∑
uv∈E ep(u, v)
+. The problem Stable Roommates with Payments
is to test whether a weighted graph allows a stable solution, i.e., a matching with
payoffs (M,p) such that B(p) = ∅, or equivalently, b(p) = 0. This problem is
well known to be polynomial-time solvable (cf. [6]); recently, an O(nm+n2 log n)
time algorithm for weighted graphs on n vertices and m edges has been given [3].
We consider two natural questions in our paper:
1. Can we gradually transform an unstable solution into a stable solution as-
suming that a stable solution exists?
2. Can we find solutions for no-instances that are “as stable as possible”?
Question 1 is of importance, as it will give us insight into the coalition formation
process. A sequence of solutions starting from an unstable one and ending in a
stable one is called a path to stability; we give a precise definition later. Ques-
tion 2 is relevant when we consider no-instances of Stable Roommates with
Payments. In order to answer it, we generalize this problem in two different
ways leading to the following two decision problems. Given a weighted graph G
and an integer k ≥ 0, the Blocking Pairs problem is to test whether G allows
a matching payoff p with |B(p)| ≤ k, and the Blocking Value problem is to
test whether G allows a matching payoff p with b(p) ≤ k.
Questions 1 and 2 have been studied in two closely related settings that are
well known and formed a motivation for our study. The first related setting is
similar to ours except that payments are not allowed. Instead, each vertex u in
an (unweighted) graph G(V,E) has a linear order on its neighbors expressing
a certain preference. Then two adjacent vertices u and v form a blocking pair
regarding a matching M if either u is not matched in M or else u prefers v to
its partner in M , and simultaneously, the same holds for v. This leads to the
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widely studied problem Stable Roommates introduced by Gale and Shapley
[7]. In this setting, the results are as follows. Answering a question by Knuth
[12], Roth and Vande Vate [13] showed the existence of a path to stability for
any yes-instance provided that the instance is bipartite. Later, their result was
generalized by Diamantoudi et al. [5] to be valid for general instances. Abra-
ham, Biro´ and Manlove [1] showed that the problem of finding a matching with
a minimum number of blocking pairs is NP-complete; note that the problem
Blocking Value cannot be translated to this setting, due to the absence of
cardinal utilities.
The second related setting originates from cooperative game theory. A coop-
erative game with transferable utilities (TU-game) is a pair (N, v), where N is
a set of n players and a value function v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0 defined for
every coalition S, which is a subset of N . In a matching game (N, v), the set N
of players is the vertex set of weighted graph G, and the value of a coalition S is
v(S) =
∑
e∈M w(e), where M is a maximum weight matching in the subgraph of
G induced by S. The strong relationship between the two settings stems from the
fact that finding a core allocation, i.e., a vector x ∈ RN with ∑u∈N xu = v(N)
and
∑
u∈S xu ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N is equivalent to solving the Stable Room-
mates with Payments (cf. [6]). The algorithms of Be´al et al. [2] and Yang
[15] applied to an n-player matching game with a nonempty core find a path to
stability with length at most (n2 + 4n)/4 and 2n− 1, respectively. For matching
games, the problems Blocking Pairs and Blocking Value are formulated as
the problems that are to test whether a matching game (N,E) allows an alloca-
tion x with |B(x)| ≤ k, or b(x) ≤ k, respectively, for some given integer k. Biro´,
Kern and Paulusma [3] showed that the first problem is NP-complete and that
the second is polynomial-time solvable by formulating it as a linear program.
Our Results. In Section 2, we answer Question 1 by showing that any unsta-
ble solution for a weighted n-vertex graph G that is a yes-instance of Stable
Roommates with Payments allows a path to stability of length at most 2n.
This generalizes a result of Chen, Fujishige and Yang [4], who show the exis-
tence of a path to stability for the aforementioned stable marriage problem with
payments, which corresponds to the case when G is bipartite. In Section 3 we
answer Question 2 by proving that Blocking Pairs and Blocking Value
are NP-complete. The latter result is somewhat surprising, as the corresponding
problem is polynomial-time solvable for matching games; we refer to Table 1 for
a survey. In addition, we show that Blocking Value does become polynomial-
time solvable if the desired matching payoff is to be with respect to some specified
matching M that is part of the input, whereas this variant of Blocking Pairs
turns out to be NP-complete.
2 Paths to stability
We first give a useful lemma, which immediately follows from the aforemen-
tioned fact that finding a core allocation in a matching game (N, v) defined on
a weighted graph G = (N,E) is equivalent to finding a stable solution for G.
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SR SRwP MG
Path to Stability Yes Yes∗ Yes
Blocking Pairs NP-complete NP-complete∗ NP-complete
Blocking Value n/a NP-complete∗ P
Table 1. A comparison of the results for the existence of a path to stability and
the problems Blocking Pairs and Blocking Value in the three different settings
of stable roommates (SR), stable roommates with payments (SRwP) and matching
games (MG). The three results marked by a ∗ are the new results shown in this paper.
Lemma 1 ([6]). Let G be a weighted graph that forms a yes-instance of Stable
Roommates with Payments. Then G allows a stable solution (M∗, p∗) where
M∗ is a maximum weight matching of G.
Let M be a matching in a graph G = (V,E). Let {u, v} be a blocking pair for
some payoff p with respect to some matching M ; note that uv /∈M by definition.
Let p′ be a payoff with respect to a matching M ′. We say that (M ′, p′) is obtained
from (M,p) by satisfying blocking pair {u, v} if the following two conditions hold:
(i) M ′ = (M \ {xy ∈M | x = u or x = v}) ∪ {uv};
(ii) p′u ≥ pu and p′v ≥ pv, whereas p′z = pz if z is neither in {u, v} nor matched
to u nor to v in M (in the latter two cases z /∈M ′ and hence p′z = 0).
That is, the players of a blocking pair become matched to each other in M ′
by leaving their former partners in M (if these existed) unmatched (and hence
with no payoff values) in M ′, and they share the extra utility coming from their
cooperation in such a way that neither of them gets worse off. Note that at
least one of them strictly improves, i.e., we have p′u > pu or p
′
v > pv. This is
due to the following two arguments. First, by the definition of a blocking pair,
pu + pv < w(uv). Second, p
′
u + p
′
v = w(uv), because p
′ is a payoff with respect
to M ′ and uv ∈M ′ by condition (i).
Let G be a weighted graph that forms a yes-instance of Stable Roommates
with Payments. A path to stability for G is a sequence of matchings with payoffs
(M0, p0), (M1, p1), . . . , (Mk, pk),
where (M0, p0), . . . , (Mk−1, pk−1) are unstable solutions and (Mk, pk) is a stable
solution, such that (M i+1, pi+1) is obtained from (M i, pi) for i = 0, . . . , k− 1 by
satisfying some blocking pair.
A known proof technique for finding a path to stability is to make use of a so-
called reference solution (see e.g. [5, 2, 11, 15]). In our setting, this comes down to
the following. We say that (M ′, p′) is obtained from (M,p) by satisfying blocking
pair {u, v} with respect to a payoff p∗ of some stable solution (M∗, p∗) that is
called a reference solution, if in addition to conditions (i)–(ii) also the following
condition is satisfied:
(iii) if pu ≤ p∗u then p′u ≤ p∗u, and if pv ≤ p∗v then p′v ≤ p∗v.
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We define S∗(p) = {u ∈ V (G) : pu > p∗u} to be the set of overpaid vertices in
(M,p) with respect to (M∗, p∗). We note that when (M ′, p′) is obtained from
(M,p) by satisfying a blocking pair with respect to p∗ then S∗(p′) ⊆ S∗(p).
In order to prove the existence of a path to stability for some graph G that is
a yes-instance of Stable Roommates with Payments, it may be easier to
find a path to stability (M0, p0), (M1, p1), . . . , (Mk, pk), where (M i+1, pi+1) is
obtained from (M i, pi) for i = 1, . . . , k by satisfying some blocking pair with
respect to p∗, in such a way that S∗(pi+1) ⊆ S∗(pi) for i = 0, . . . , k − 1, with
strict inclusion occurring after a certain number of steps; the latter property
is then to guarantee that an algorithm for solving this problem will eventually
terminate in a stable solution.
We will use the approach described above in order to show that any weighted
n-vertex graph G that forms a yes-instance of Stable Roommates with Pay-
ments allows a path to stability of length 2n that starts in an arbitrary unstable
solution. Before we give the proof, we first explain in more detail how our result
is connected to results from the literature. Our result is based on the work of
Ko´czy and Lauwers [11] on the so-called accessibility of the coalition structure
core. Their result implies the existence of a path to stability for any TU-game
with a nonempty core. In this setting, a path to stability is a sequence of grad-
ual changes that transform a non-core allocation to a core allocation. Recently,
Be´al et al. [2] and Yang [15] built on the work of Ko´czy and Lauwers [11] in
order to show the accessibility of the coalition structure core in quadratic time.
In particular, Yang [15] obtained a linear upper bound on the length of a path
to stability for all TU-games with a nonempty core, which include the match-
ing games with a nonempty core. We can use their proof techniques [2, 15] for
our setting. Our arguments are slightly different though, because for matching
games (N, v) every coalition S ⊆ N may be blocking instead of only pairs {u, v}
as in our setting. As a consequence, for matching games several blocking pairs
may be satisfied in one step by choosing the affected vertices to form a blocking
coalition. Moreover, even if the starting solution is a matching with payoffs and
the final solution is a stable matching with payoffs, the intermediate solutions in
a path to stability for matching games are not necessarily such allocations that
can be realized as matchings with payoffs. Therefore, the arguments of Yang [15]
for restricting the path length cannot be translated to obtain our linear upper
bound. By pinpointing the connection to the setting of cooperative games, we
are not only able to generalize the corresponding result of Chen, Fujishige and
Yang [4] for the existence of a path to stability for bipartite instances (which are
always yes-instances) to general yes-instances, but we could also give a simpler
proof of this result with a linear upper bound on the number of blocking pairs
that need to be satisfied.
Theorem 1. Let G be a weighted n-vertex graph that forms a yes-instance of
Stable Roommates with Payments; Let (M0, p0) be a matching with payoffs.
Then there exists a path to stability of length at most 2n that starts in (M0, p0).
Proof. Let G be a weighed n-vertex graph that forms a yes-instance of Stable
Roommates with Payments; we also call such a graph G stable. Let (M0, p0)
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be a matching with payoffs. We fix a stable reference solution (M∗, p∗), where
we may assume that M∗ is a maximum weight matching due to Lemma 1. Note
that |M∗| ≤ n2 and |M0| ≤ n2 . Moreover, |S∗(p0)| ≤ n2 , because the vertices u
and v of a pair uv ∈ M0 cannot both belong to S∗(p0), as otherwise p0u > p∗u,
p0v > p
∗
v and w(uv) = p
0
u + p
0
v would imply that {u, v} is a blocking pair for
(M∗, p∗).
Input: a matching with payoffs (M0, p0) in a weighted stable graph G
Output: a stable solution
Set i := 0.
Phase 1: while there is a blocking pair {u, v} for (M i, pi) such that uv ∈M∗ do
satisfy {u, v} with respect to p∗, (M i+1, pi+1)← (M i, pi); set i := i + 1.
Phase 2: if there is a blocking pair {u, v} for (M i, pi) then
satisfy {u, v} with respect to p∗, (M i+1, pi+1)← (M i, pi); set i := i+ 1, and
return to Phase 1.
Return (M i, pi).
Fig. 1. The algorithm for finding a path to stability. Contrary to the algorithms of
Be´al et al. [2] and Yang [15], we do not have to specify the payoff pi+1; any vector pi+1
that is a payoff with respect to M i+1 and satisfies conditions (ii)-(iii) may be chosen.
To obtain a path of stability we run the algorithm displayed in Figure 1.
Recall that S∗(pi+1) ⊆ S∗(pi) for any solution (M i, pi) for which the algorithm
performs Phase 1 or 2. Now we will prove that whenever we satisfy a blocking
pair {u, v} with uv /∈M∗ in Phase 2 the above relation is strict. More precisely,
let (M i, pi) be a solution after a termination of Phase 1 (so, there is no {u, v}
with uv ∈ M∗ that is a blocking pair for (M i, pi)) and let (M i+1, pi+1) be the
solution obtained after satisfying a blocking pair {ui, vi} with uivi /∈ M∗ for
(M i, pi). Then we will show that S∗(pi+1) ⊂ S∗(pi). We first show three claims,
where we write w(M) =
∑
uv∈M w(uv) for a matching M .
Claim 1. p∗u + p
∗
v = p
i
u + p
i
v for all uv ∈M∗, and M i has maximum weight.
We prove Claim 1 as follows. Because there is no pair of vertices {u, v} with
uv ∈M∗ that is a blocking pair for (M i, pi), we have p∗u + p∗v = w(uv) ≤ piu + piv
for all uv ∈M∗. This implies that
w(M∗) =
∑
uv∈M∗
p∗u + p
∗
v ≤
∑
uv∈M∗
piu + p
i
v ≤ w(M i).
However, because M∗ is a maximum weight matching, we have equality every-
where, i.e., we have p∗u + p
∗
v = p
i
u + p
i
v for all uv ∈ M∗, and w(M i) = w(M∗).
The latter equality implies that M i is a maximum weight matching as well.
Claim 2. piu + p
i
v = p
∗
u + p
∗
v for all uv ∈M i.
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We prove Claim 2 as follows. The stability of (M∗, p∗) implies that piu + p
i
v =
w(uv) ≤ p∗u + p∗v for all uv ∈M i. This leads to
w(M i) =
∑
uv∈Mi
piu + p
i
v ≤
∑
uv∈Mi
p∗u + p
∗
v ≤ w(M∗).
Together with the maximality of M i that follows from Claim 1, this means that
we have equality everywhere again, so piu + p
i
v = p
∗
u + p
∗
v for all uv ∈M i.
Claim 3. If w is unmatched in M i or M∗, then piw = p
∗
w = 0.
We prove Claim 3 as follows. Suppose that w is unmatched in M i. Then piw = 0
by definition. We use Claim 2 and the fact that M∗ and M i are maximum weight
matchings to obtain w(M∗) = w(M i) =
∑
uv∈Mi(p
i
u + p
i
v) =
∑
uv∈Mi(p
∗
u + p
∗
v).
By definition, w(M∗) =
∑
u∈V p
∗
u. Due to these two equalities, p
∗
w = 0. The case
when w is unmatched in M∗ can be proven by similar arguments. This completes
the proof of Claim 3.
We now consider the pair {ui, vi} and write u = ui and v = vi. Because {u, v}
is a blocking pair for (M i, pi), whereas (M∗, p∗) is a stable solution, we deduce
that piu + p
i
v < w(uv) ≤ p∗u + p∗v; note that this means that w(uv) > 0. If u and
v are both unmatched in M i, then p∗u = p
∗
v = 0 by Claim 3. Then w(uv) ≤ 0,
which is not possible. Hence, we are left to analyze two cases.
First suppose that one of u, v, say u, is unmatched in M i, whereas v is
matched by M i, say vy ∈M i. Because u is unmatched, piu = p∗u = 0 by Claim 3.
Because we already deduced that piu + p
i
v < p
∗
u + p
∗
v, this means that p
i
v < p
∗
v.
The inequality piv < p
∗
v and the equality p
i
v + p
i
y = p
∗
v + p
∗
y from Claim 2 imply
that piy > p
∗
y, i.e., y ∈ S∗(pi). Because y becomes unmatched after satisfying uv
by definition, we find that pi+1(y) = 0. Hence, S∗(pi+1) ⊂ S∗(pi).
Now suppose that both u and v are matched in M i. Let xu ∈ M i and
vy ∈M i. The equalities pix + piu = p∗x + p∗u and piv + piy = p∗v + p∗y from Claim 2,
together with the aforementioned inequality piu + p
i
v < p
∗
u + p
∗
v, imply that
pix + p
i
y > p
∗
x + p
∗
y. Hence, p
i
x > p
∗
x or p
i
y > p
∗
y. This means that x or y is in
S∗(pi). We may assume without loss of generality that x ∈ S∗(pi). Because x
becomes unmatched after satisfying uv by definition, we find that pi+1(x) = 0.
Hence, S∗(pi+1) ⊂ S∗(pi) also in this case.
Because the number of overpaid vertices decreases after each execution of
Phase 2, the algorithm terminates and the returned solution (M `, p`) is stable.
Consequently, we have shown the existence of a path to stability.
Now we set the linear upper bound for the number of steps ` required to
reach a stable solution. Each time we satisfy a blocking pair not in M∗ in Phase
2, the number of overpaid vertices decreases. Hence, we cannot satisfy more than
|S∗(p0)| ≤ n2 of them. Regarding the pairs of M∗, after the first time we satisfy
a pair uv ∈ M∗ we may need to satisfy it again only if u or v is involved in a
blocking pair {x, u} or {u, y}, respectively, that is not in M∗ and that is satisfied
in Phase 2. Hence, the satisfaction of a pair xu not in M∗ may result that at
most two pairs in M∗, involving either x or u, can be subsequently satisfied in
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Phase 1, but all the other pairs of M∗ satisfied in this execution of Phase 1 must
be satisfied for the first time. Therefore we have the following upper bounds:
• We satisfy at most n2 pairs not in M∗.
• We satisfy at most n2 pairs of M∗ for the first time.
• We satisfy pairs of M∗ not for the first time at most 2 · n2 = n times.
Thus we satisfy at most ` = n2 +
n
2 +n = 2n pairs. This completes our proof. uunionsq
Remark. Our proof of Theorem 1 is constructive. The algorithm of Figure 1
constructs a path to stability starting in any unstable solution. Due to the linear
upper bound stated in Theorem 1, its running time is O(n2) time for weighted
graphs on n vertices, given a stable reference solution (M∗, p∗) which, if neces-
sary, we can compute in O(nm+ n2 log n) [3].
3 Blocking Pairs and Blocking Value
We start this section by showing that Blocking Pairs and Blocking Value
are NP-complete. We prove the hardness of these two problems by a reduction
from Independent Set, in a similar way as was done for the Blocking Pairs
problem in the setting of matching games [3]. However, the latter setting and our
setting are quite different in nature; in particular, we recall that the Blocking
Value problem is polynomial-time solvable in the setting of matching games [3].
Hence, our hardness proof uses a number of different arguments than the hard-
ness proof for Blocking Pairs in the setting of matching games [3].
Theorem 2. Blocking Pairs and Blocking Value are NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly, both problems are in NP. In order to prove NP-completeness,
we reduce from the Independent Set problem. This problem takes as input
a graph G with an integer k and is to test whether G contains an independent
set of size at least k, i.e., a set S with |S| ≥ k such that there is no edge in G
between any two vertices of S. Garey, Johnson and Stockmeyer [9] show that
Independent Set is already NP-complete for the class of 3-regular graphs, i.e.,
graphs in which all vertices are of degree three. So we may assume that G is
3-regular. We also assume that k ≥ 2. Let n = |V | and let V = {v1, . . . , vn}.
From G we construct a weighted graph G∗ = (V ∗, E∗) on 2n + k(4k + 3)
vertices. First, we add a set V ′ of n new vertices v′1, . . . , v
′
n, where we add an
edge between vi and v
′
i for i = 1, . . . , n. So, every v
′
i has a unique neighbor in
the resulting graph, namely vi. Now let K be a complete graph on r = 4k + 3
vertices; note that r is odd. We add k mutually vertex-disjoint copies K1, . . . ,Kk
of K to the graph constructed so far. In each copy Ki we specify a vertex ui
leading to a set U = {u1, . . . , uk}. We then finish our construction of G∗ by
adding an edge uhvi for all 1 ≤ h ≤ k and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n; see Figure 2. It remains
to define an edge weighting w on G∗. We let w(uhvi) = 12 for all 1 ≤ h ≤ k and
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, whereas we assign all other edges e of G∗ weight w(e) = 1.
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v1
v′1
G vn
v′n
G∗ MV1
V1
K1 Kk
u1 uk
Fig. 2. The graph G∗ and an example of a matching MV1 . The edges within the sub-
graph G of G∗ have not been drawn.
We make the following observation that is important for the remainder of the
proof. By our construction, there exists a matching MV1 for each subset V1 ⊆ V
of size k that can be decomposed as MV1 = M1∪· · ·∪Mk∪MUV1∪MV2V ′2 , where
Mh is a perfect matching of K
h−uh for h = 1, . . . , k, MUV1 is a perfect matching
of G∗[U ∪ V1] and MV2V ′2 is a perfect matching of G∗[V2 ∪ V ′2 ] for V2 = V \ V1
and its set of neighbors V ′2 in V
′. We call a matching MV1 as defined above a
V1-matching. Note that V1 has more than one V1-matching, because we can pick
different perfect matchings for the decomposition of MV1 (except for the perfect
matching MV2V ′2 of G[V2, V
′
2 ], which is unique).
For our two NP-hardness reductions, it suffices to show that the following
three statements are equivalent.
(i) G has an independent set S of size at most k.
(ii) |B(p)| ≤ k for some matching payoff p of G∗.
(iii) b(p) ≤ k for some matching payoff p of G∗.
“(i) ⇒ (ii)” Suppose that G has an independent set S of size |S| ≥ k. Then we
may assume without loss of generality that |S| = k, as otherwise we could just
remove some vertices from S. We pick an arbitrary S-matching MS and define a
payoff p with respect to MS as follows. We let p ≡ 12 on K1 ∪ · · · ∪Kk, whereas
we let p ≡ 1 on V \S and p ≡ 0 on S ∪V ′. Because S is an independent set and
p ≡ 1 on V \ S, no pair {vi, vj} is a blocking pair. This and the definition of p
ensures that B(p) = {{vi, v′i} | vi ∈ S}, which has size k.
“(ii) ⇒ (iii)” Suppose that |B(p)| ≤ k for some matching payoff p of G∗. Then
b(p) ≤ k, because each blocking pair in B(p) can contribute at most a value of
1 to the total blocking value b(p) as the maximum value of w is 1.
“(iii) ⇒ (i)” Suppose that b(p) ≤ k for some matching payoff p of G∗. Assume
that b(p) is minimum over all matching payoffs. Let M be the associated match-
ing. We first show three useful claims.
Claim 1. For all 1 ≤ h ≤ k, every z ∈ VKh \ {uh} is matched by M .
We prove Claim 1 as follows. First suppose that there exists some complete
graph Kh that contains a nonempty subset D of vertices that are not equal to
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uh and that are unmatched in M . Let A = VKh \ {uh ∪D}. We write α = |A|
and δ = |D|. By our construction, the vertices in A can only be matched by M
via matching edges in Kh[A]. By definition, pz + pz′ = 1 for all zz
′ ∈ M with
z, z′ ∈ A. This means that ∑z∈A pz = 12α. Moreover, p ≡ 0 on D by definition,
and δ ≥ 1 by our assumption. We let E1 be the set of edges with one end-vertex
in A and the other one in D. We let E2 be the set of edges with both end-vertices
in D. By using the properties of A and D, we find that
k ≥ b(p) ≥
∑
zz′∈E1
(1− pz − pz′) +
∑
zz′∈E2
(1− pz − pz′)
= δ
∑
z∈A
(1− pz) +
∑
zz′∈E2
1
= αδ − 12αδ +
1
2
δ(δ − 1)
= 12αδ +
1
2
δ(δ − 1).
Recall that δ ≥ 1. We distinguish three cases. If δ = 1, then α = r−δ−1 = r−2.
Then our deduction implies that k ≥ 12α = 12 (r − 2), which is equivalent to
r ≤ 2k+ 2. If δ = 2, then α = r−3, and we find that k ≥ α+ 1 = r−2, which is
equivalent to r ≤ k + 2. If δ ≥ 3, then we find that k ≥ 32α+ δ ≥ α+ δ = r − 1,
which is equivalent to r ≤ k+1. Hence, in all three cases, we find that r ≤ 2k+2.
This is not possible, because r = 4k + 3 > 2k + 2. We conclude that D = ∅.
Hence, we have proven Claim 1.
Claim 2. There exists a subset V1 ⊆ V such that the restriction of M to the edges
of G∗[V1 ∪ U ] is a perfect matching.
We prove Claim 2 as follows. First suppose that there exists some uh that is
unmatched in M . Then puh = 0 by definition. Let A = VKh \ {uh}. Note that
|A| = r − 1 is even, because r is odd. Claim 1 tells us that the vertices of
A are matched by edges of M . By construction, these matching edges must
have both end-vertices in A. Because pz + pz′ = 1 for all zz
′ ∈ M and p ≥ 0,
this means that there are at least 12 (r − 1) vertices in A, whose payoff is at
most 12 . We consider the edges between v and those vertices and deduce that
k ≥ b(p) ≥ 12 (r − 1)(1 − 12 − 0), which is equivalent to r ≤ 4k + 1. This is not
possible, because r = 4k + 3. Hence, every uh is matched by M .
Now suppose that uh forms a matching edge of M together with some other
vertex z of Kh. Then M cannot cover all vertices of Kh, because r is odd. This
is not possible due to Claim 1. Hence, every uh forms a matching edge of M with
some vertex vi from V . This gives us the set V1, and we have proven Claim 2.
Claim 3. p ≡ 12 on U .
We prove Claim 3 as follows. Suppose that puh <
1
2 for some 1 ≤ h ≤ k. By
Claim 2, uh forms a matching edge of M with some vertex vi. Then puh + pvi =
w(uhvi) =
1
2 . Then pvi =  > 0. We modify p into a new payoff p
′ with respect
to M by increasing the payoff to uh with  and decreasing the payoff of vi to
10
zero. Because G is 3-regular, vi has 3 neighbors in G. As in the proof of Claim 2,
there are at least 12 (r−1) vertices in Kh−uh, whose payoff is at most 12 . Hence,
taking into account the other neighbors of vi in G
∗ as well, our modification of
p decreases the total blocking value by at most (k + 4) but at the same time
increases it by at least 12 (r − 1). Hence, b(p′) ≥ b(p) − (k + 4) + 12 (r − 1) =
b(p) + ( 12 (r − 1)− (k + 4)) > b(p), where the latter inequality follows from the
fact that r ≥ 4k + 2 ≥ 2k + 5, as we assume that k ≥ 2. However, b(p′) > b(p)
contradicts the minimality of b(p). Hence, we have proven Claim 3.
We are now ready to argue how to find an independent set of size at least k
in G. Let V1 be the set from Claim 2. By Claim 3 and the fact that the weights
w(e) of every edge e between U and V is set to 12 , we find that p ≡ 0 on V1.
Due to Claim 2, no vertex v′i with vi ∈ V1 can be matched by M . Hence, pv′i = 0
for every vi ∈ V1. Because |U | = k, we find that |V1| = k. Let E′1 denote the
set of edges viv
′
i with vi ∈ V1. Because |V1| = k, we obtain |E′1| = k. Suppose
that V1 contains two adjacent vertices vi and vj . Then b(p) ≥
∑
zz′∈E′1(1− pz −
pz′) + (1− pvi − pvj ) = k + 1. This is not possible, because b(p) ≤ k. Hence, no
two vertices in V1 are adjacent. In other words, V1 is an independent set of size
|V1| = k, as desired. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. uunionsq
The problems Restricted Blocking Pairs and Restricted Blocking
Value take as input a graph G, an integer k, and a matching M of G, and are
to decide whether G has a payoff p with respect to M such that |B(p)| ≤ k or
b(p) ≤ k, respectively.
Theorem 3. The Restricted Blocking Value problem is polynomial-time
solvable, whereas the Restricted Blocking Pairs problem is NP-complete
even for graphs with unit edge weights.
Proof. We first consider the Restricted Blocking Value problem. Let G =
(V,E) be a graph with an edge weighting w. Let M be a given matching of G.
We let VM denote the set of vertices of G matched by M . Then we can formulate
the Restricted Blocking Value problem as the linear program
(RBV) min
∑
uv∈E\M
zuv
s.t. pu + pv = w(uv) (uv ∈M)
pu + pv + zuv ≥ w(uv) (uv ∈ E \M)
pu ≥ 0 (u ∈ VM )
pu = 0 (u ∈ V \ VM )
zuv ≥ 0 (uv ∈ E \M)
Consequently, Restricted Blocking Value can be solved in polynomial time
by the ellipsoid method [10].
We now consider the Restricted Blocking Pairs problem. Clearly, this
problem is in NP. In order to prove NP-completeness, we reduce from the 3-
Satisfiability problem, which is NP-complete (cf. [8]).
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Given an instance of 3-Satisfiability with Boolean variables x1, . . . , xn and
clauses C1, . . . , Cm, we construct a graph G as follows (see Figure 3).
• For i = 1, . . . , n, construct adjacent vertices xi, xi that correspond to the
literals over xi.
• For j = 1, . . . ,m, construct pairwise adjacent vertices u(1)j , u(2)j , u(3)j and
pairwise adjacent vertices v
(1)
j , v
(2)
j , v
(3)
j , then add the edges u
(1)
j v
(1)
j , u
(2)
j v
(2)
j ,
u
(3)
j v
(3)
j .
• For j = 1, . . . ,m, let Cj = z1 ∨ z2 ∨ z3. Join u(1)j , u(2)j , u(3)j with the vertices
that correspond to the literals z1, z2, z3 by edges respectively.
• Construct m+ 1 vertices w0, . . . , wm; for s = 0, . . . ,m and i = 1, . . . , n, add
the edges wsxi and wsxi, and for s = 0, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . ,m add the
edges wsu
(1)
j , wsu
(2)
j , wsu
(3)
j , wsv
(1)
j , wsv
(2)
j , wsv
(3)
j .
Finally, we define
M = {xixi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {u(r)j v(r)j | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ r ≤ 3},
and k = (n + 3m)(m + 1) + m. We prove that the formula φ = C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Cm
can be satisfied if and only if there is a payoff p for G with respect to M with
|B(p)| ≤ k.
x1 x1 xi xi xn xn
w0
ws
wm
u
(1)
j
v
(1)
j
u
(2)
j
v
(3)
j
v
(2)
j
u
(3)
j
Fig. 3. The construction of G. For clarity, only one clause has been displayed, which
in this example is the clause Cj = {x1, xi, xn}, and moreover, the edges incident to wi
for i 6= s have not been drawn. The edges that belong to M are shown by thick lines.
First suppose that φ can be satisfied, i.e., that the variables x1, . . . , xn are
assigned values such that φ = true. We define a vector p as follows.
• For s = 0, . . . ,m, we set pws = 0.
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• For i = 1, . . . , n, we set pxi = 1, pxi = 0 if xi = true, and pxi = 0, pxi = 1
otherwise.
• For j = 1, . . . ,m, if Cj = z1 ∨ z2 ∨ z3, then we choose a literal zr = true for
some r ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and we set p
u
(r)
j
= 0, p
v
(r)
j
= 1 and p
u
(h)
j
= 1, p
v
(h)
j
= 0 for
h ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {r}.
It is straightforward to check that p is a payoff with respect to M . Observe that
for all s ∈ {0, . . . ,m} and all ab ∈ M , exactly one of the pairs {ws, a}, {ws, b}
is a blocking pair. We also have for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m that {v(h)j , v(h
′)
j } ∈ B(p) for
{h, h′} = {1, 2, 3} \ {r}. Moreover, all other pairs of adjacent vertices are not
blocking pairs. Hence, |B(p)| = (n+ 3m)(m+ 1) +m = k.
Now suppose that p is a payoff for G with respect to M such that |B(p)| ≤ k.
By definition, pws = 0 for s = 0, . . . ,m. Hence, for each ab ∈ M , we have at
least one of {ws, a}, {ws, b} is in B(p), and if pa < 1 and pb < 1, then both
{ws, a} and {ws, b} are in B(p). This observation together with the inequality
|B(p)| ≤ (n+ 3m)(m+ 1) +m yields that for each ab ∈M , either pa = 1, pb = 0
or pa = 0, pb = 1. As a consequence, exactly (n + 3m)(m + 1) blocking pairs
include the vertices w0, . . . , wm.
Consider an index j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. If p
u
(1)
j
= p
u
(2)
j
= p
u
(3)
j
= 1, then p
v
(1)
j
=
p
v
(2)
j
= p
v
(3)
j
= 0 and {v(h)j , v(h
′)
j } ∈ B(p) for all 1 ≤ h < h′ ≤ 3. Similarly, if
p
u
(1)
j
= p
u
(2)
j
= p
u
(3)
j
= 0 and p
v
(1)
j
= p
v
(2)
j
= p
v
(3)
j
= 1, then {u(h)j , u(h
′)
j } ∈ B(p)
for all 1 ≤ h < h′ ≤ 3. If there exist indices h, h′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} with h 6= h′ such
that p
u
(h)
j
= 0 and p
v
(h′)
j
= 0, then exactly one of the pairs from the set
{
{u(1)j , u(2)j }, {u(2)j , u(3)j }, {u(1)j , u(3)j }, {v(1)j , v(2)j }, {v(2)j , v(3)j }, {v(1)j , v(3)j }
}
is a blocking pair. Since G can have only k − (n + 3m)(m + 1) = m blocking
pairs of this type, we conclude that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there is an index
h ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that p
u
(h)
j
= 0, and moreover, if xi or xi is adjacent to u
(h)
j ,
then {xi, u(h)j } or {xi, u(h)j }, respectively, is not a blocking pair.
Now for i = 1, . . . , n, we set the variable xi = true if pxi = 1, and xi = false
otherwise. Consider a clause Cj = z1 ∨ z2 ∨ z3. There is an index h ∈ {1, 2, 3}
such that p
u
(h)
j
= 0. First suppose that zh = xi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then vertex
u
(h)
j is adjacent to the vertex xi, and {xi, u(h)j } /∈ B(p). Then pxi = 1 and the
variable xi = true. Now suppose that zh = xi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then vertex
u
(h)
j is adjacent to the vertex xi and pxi = 1, i.e., the variable xi = false. In
both cases Cj contains a literal with the value true. It follows that φ = true.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3. uunionsq
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4 Future Work
Very recently, Bock, Ko¨neman, Peis and Sanita` (personal communication, Au-
gust 2012) announced that Blocking Pairs is NP-complete even for graphs
with unit edge weights. Their NP-hardness reduction does not work for the
Blocking Value problem. Hence, we finish our paper by stating the follow-
ing open problem. What is the computational complexity of Blocking Value
restricted to input graphs with unit edge weights?
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